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Abstract Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold war, there is no viable alterna-
tive to naTo’s security umbrella over an expanded Europe. The eastern part of the 
continent is confronting a revisionist and expansionist russia. its stability can only be 
ensured by an effective alliance that establishes permanent bases in the most vulner-
able regions as a deterrent to Moscow’s aggression. a strong uS presence within 
a broad alliance that includes all of Europe’s democracies is in america’s national 
interest and that of all naTo members. This is needed to preserve security across the 
European continent and to assist in confronting assorted threats to the transatlantic 
commonwealth.
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Introduction
Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold war, there is no viable alternative on the 
horizon to naTo’s security umbrella over an expanded Europe. The idea floated a 
quarter of a century ago that Europe could scale down its defences and even disman-
tle the north atlantic alliance exposed a flawed fixation on an ‘end of history’ scenario 
that has never materialised. in practice, the forces of state nationalism and imperialist 
revisionism in russia have proved stronger than those of liberalism and international 
cooperation with the west.
in many respects, a ‘return of history’ scenario has become more evident in and 
around Europe, with russia re-emerging as a revanchist power and threatening 
Europe’s entire eastern flank. in addition, the Eu itself faces existential problems, from 
the financial and institutional to the demographic and political. in a potentially unstable 
and fracturing continent, naTo is the sole remaining institution that upholds interna-
tional security. and it may become the sole multinational organisation that can provide 
Europe with a measure of coherence. Moreover, naTo is the binding glue of the trans-
atlantic link with washington.
NATO without alternatives
Several western European states have hosted uS bases since the creation of naTo 
in april 1949. Since the end of the Cold war and the dismantling of the Soviet bloc 
in the early 1990s, numerous voices among the new naTo members have called for 
permanent bases that would include uS troops in the eastern part of the continent. 
Such voices have grown louder as russia under president Vladimir putin has become 
increasingly assertive and is now threatening the independence of numerous states, 
from the Baltic region to the Black and Caspian Seas.
a naTo alliance that encompasses all of Europe with a permanent multinational mili-
tary presence in Europe’s east is essential for four fundamental reasons. First, there is 
no viable alternative to naTo’s political and military structure. The Eu does not provide 
security or generate confidence among states facing potential aggression. The Eu’s 
Common Foreign and Security policy is primarily a diplomatic mechanism, which openly 
acknowledges that naTo remains responsible for the territorial defence of Europe. 
although the Eu has engaged in several peacekeeping, policing and humanitarian 
missions, naTo possesses the main combat force not only of its European members, 
but most importantly of the uS, which contributes a disproportionate share of alliance 
troops, equipment and other resources.
a strong naTo alliance is the backbone of European security. proposals for a Euro-
pean army simply dilute and distract attention from the only capable multinational west-
ern security organisation. a European army would not only siphon off naTo’s already 
limited assets and diminish its capabilities, but would also trigger rivalries between 
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Europe and north america over the deployment of military forces. additionally, it could 
split Europe between countries committed to upholding close security relations with the 
uS and states at a safer distance from russia that see a lesser need for american 
security guarantees. Such an outcome would in effect grant Moscow a strategic victory 
over naTo.
The second reason an effective naTo is needed is that it contributes to ensuring 
the institutional integrity of members, together with promoting regional stability between 
them. its entry stipulations include functional statehood, minority rights, civilian control 
over the military and settled borders with all neighbours. all new members have had to 
fulfil these criteria. Such conditionality also generates confidence for foreign investors 
and sets the stage for the integration of member states into the Eu.
The third rationale for an expanded naTo concerns the sovereign choice of every 
independent state to determine its alliances and security links and not remain vulner-
able to pressure from predatory neighbours such as russia. in this context, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between russia’s national interests and Moscow’s state ambitions. if 
russia’s neighbours join naTo, this poses no threat to russia’s security—contrary to 
the Kremlin’s claims. However, it does thwart russia’s ability to control these countries’ 
security postures and foreign policy.
russia’s ambitions revolve around expanding the ‘Eurasian’ zone in which russia 
is the dominant political player. ‘Eurasianism’ involves two interconnected strategies: 
transforming Europe into an appendage of the russian sphere of influence and debili-
tating atlanticism by undermining Europe’s connections with the uS.
The Eu occupies a pivotal position in russia’s strategy as it can either strengthen 
or weaken the Kremlin’s approach. Moscow views a unified Eu foreign policy that is 
synchronised with washington’s and undermines russia’s aspirations as a threat that 
needs to be neutralised. The Eu’s democratisation agenda is also perceived as a perni-
cious ploy to undermine russia’s agenda of supporting pliable governments in neigh-
bouring post-Soviet states. Furthermore, Eu standards for government accountability, 
business transparency and market competition endanger russia’s economic penetra-
tion, which is primarily based on opaque and corrupt business practices.
an accommodationist western approach that concedes some special ‘national inter-
ests’ to russia not only is unacceptable to all the independent states that emerged 
from the Soviet union and the Soviet bloc, but also whets Moscow’s appetite for further 
imperial aggrandisement. paradoxically, consenting to russia’s asymmetrical ‘national 
interests’, through which it claims a privileged role in influencing its neighbours’ affairs, 
is more likely to result in a collision with naTo than a more dynamic approach. if the 
Kremlin operates with the conviction that it has a free hand to methodically undermine 
countries along its borders, this could result in serious miscalculations when it over-
reaches by sparking conflicts with alliance members.
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Emerging threats from Moscow
The fourth and most important reason why a substantial naTo military presence in 
Eastern Europe is vital is that it forms the most effective deterrent and responder to 
major new threats. Two core challenges emanate from russia: expansion and implo-
sion. Moscow’s primary objective is to restore russia as a major pole of power in a 
multi-polar world. The overarching goal with regard to the west is to reverse uS influ-
ences in Europe and Eurasia. russia’s neo-imperial project seeks predominant influ-
ence over the foreign and security policies of immediate neighbours so that they will 
either remain neutral or support russia’s agenda. in effect, russia seeks dependent 
protectorates along its borders, tied into institutions controlled from Moscow (Bugajski 
and Doran 2016).
while its goals are imperial, the Kremlin’s strategies and tactics are flexible, and this 
can make them more effective than if they were rigid. Moscow engages in enticements, 
threats, incentives and pressures, while claiming it is pragmatically pursuing its national 
interests. it pursues asymmetrical offensives by interjecting itself in its neighbours’ 
affairs, capturing important sectors of local economies, subverting vulnerable political 
systems, corrupting national leaders, penetrating key security institutions, challenging 
territorial integrity and undermining international unity.
Moscow is also not averse to using direct military force, as exemplified by the war 
against Georgia in august 2008, followed by the forced partitioning of abkhazia and 
South ossetia, and the attack on ukraine in March 2014 with the annexation of Crimea. 
according to a recent report by ranD Corporation, given current force deployments, 
russia could steamroll across the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with 
ground forces reaching the three capitals in a matter of hours. without a more intensive 
regional presence, naTo forces would not have the ability to defend its most exposed 
states (Shlapak and Johnson 2016). Hence, the factor of deterrence may have limited 
value if Moscow decides to test naTo’s response.
The ranD report mirrors the concerns of Chairman of the naTo Military Committee 
General petr pavel, who has warned that Moscow could conquer the three Baltic states 
within two days despite their naTo membership. This is possible because of russia’s 
ongoing military expansion, naTo’s relatively slow-moving command structure, and 
the decline in alliance capabilities because of lowered defence spending and the with-
drawal of uS forces, including two heavily armoured uS divisions from Germany, with 
only two now remaining in Europe.
russia’s potential implosion could present an even more unpredictable future in which 
naTo would need to manage the multi-regional repercussions. a huge failed state on 
Europe’s doorstep would have various destabilising consequences for the continent—
whether refugee outflows, the spillover of violence, civil wars or the emergence of new 
aspiring states. paradoxically, putin’s attempts to construct a new russia-centred 
dominion are likely to accelerate the country’s decline.
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an economically and militarily overstretched russia may witness escalating eco-
nomic, social, political and sub-regional turmoil and present even more menacing chal-
lenges for western policy. naTo needs to assess the possible consequences of the 
chaotic downfall of the putinist system and prepare contingencies for the conflicts that 
this may generate. in particular, russia’s neighbours must be shielded from the most 
destabilising scenarios of civil conflict and russia’s violent fragmentation, which could 
spill into naTo territory. By positioning permanent naTo bases in the countries border-
ing russia, the alliance would be better prepared for the negative consequences.
NATO realism
naTo’s European flank remains dependent on the uS for its security, as its defence 
expenditures have been seriously depleted since the end of the Cold war. without 
american involvement Europe would be unable to deter an increasingly belligerent rus-
sia. Europe’s demilitarisation over the last decade has coincided with russia’s military 
build-up (Michta 2015). The uS provides 70 % of all naTo defence spending, while 
Europe’s contribution to naTo’s military capability is less than 25 %, and the figure is 
steadily falling. Several countries have decimated their equipment to such an extent 
that they may be incapable of deploying more than a few thousand troops in the event 
of outright war. Meanwhile, russia is re-arming to the tune of $700 billion over the next 
decade and plans to introduce the next generation of armour, aircraft and missiles, and 
to modernise its nuclear forces.
Since the end of the Cold war, uS officials have been prodding their European coun-
terparts to increase defence spending in line with naTo guidelines of 2 % of GDp. Sev-
eral uS defence secretaries have challenged their allies to stop cutting financial support 
for naTo in the face of emerging and escalating security threats. They have argued 
that this could result in Europe’s ‘demilitarisation’, particularly in western Europe, where 
political leaders and publics are becoming increasingly averse to the deployment of 
military force. Shortfalls in funding and capabilities will make it difficult for the alliance 
to handle several simultaneous security dangers. over the past decade only a hand-
ful of naTo members have consistently spent 2 % of their GDp on defence. During 
2015 the defence budgets of several members, including the uK and Germany, actu-
ally shrank, despite pledges issued at naTo’s wales Summit in September 2014 to 
increase financing of the military. in stark contrast, several front-line naTo states have 
decided to steadily increase their defence budgets in the face of growing threats from 
russia. These include poland, romania and the three Baltic states.
in addition to increased funding, the European allies must also pursue military mod-
ernisation and become capable of defending all of naTo’s borders rather than operating 
under the traditional formula of simply being able to retaliate and allowing the extended 
deterrent to be provided primarily by washington. There are legitimate concerns that 
most European states could not realistically meet the goals of optimal capability with-
out significant reforms to their military structure and the elimination of waste, duplica-
tion and mismanagement in their defence bureaucracies. if the current feebleness in 
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defence spending and capabilities continues, the next uS president will come under 
increasing domestic pressure to curtail the american commitment to Europe’s secu-
rity. This will certainly suit a revisionist Kremlin that continues to test naTo’s defences 
along russia’s western flank.
in response to conventional military threats from russia, it is essential to have an 
effective tripwire by ensuring the permanent presence of soldiers from various naTo 
states in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and poland, the most exposed members bordering 
russia. Moves in this direction, through the use of air policing units, regular military 
exercises and the creation of small bases to accommodate the planned naTo rapid 
reaction Force, were taken as the war in ukraine unfolded during 2014 and 2015. 
nonetheless, fears remained that without a more permanent stationing of substantial 
multinational naTo forces in the front-line states, these countries could be quickly over-
run by a russian assault.
at a mini-naTo summit in Bucharest on 4 november 2015, nine countries—Bulgaria, 
the Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, poland, romania and Slova-
kia—signed a declaration calling on naTo to maintain a permanent presence in the 
region to deter russian aggression. Since Moscow’s assault on ukraine, naTo has 
taken initial steps to bolster the defence of vulnerable members by adding combat air-
craft support to naTo’s Baltic air policing mission: dispatching a dozen F-16 fighters to 
poland, and deploying airborne warning and Control System reconnaissance aircraft in 
poland and romania to help patrol naTo’s eastern borders. naTo has also drawn up 
defence plans for poland and the Baltic states, including guarantees of naTo’s military 
response to outside attacks.
Deliberations have also intensified over the potential hosting of naTo military infra-
structure. However, at the naTo Summit on 4–5 September 2014, alliance leaders did 
not endorse the positioning of permanent bases in Eastern Central Europe despite the 
urging from warsaw and the three Baltic governments. instead, they agreed to create a 
spearhead contingent within the existing naTo response Force—a Very High readi-
ness Joint Task Force (VJTF). once formed, it would be capable of deploying at short 
notice along naTo’s periphery and would consist of land, air, maritime and Special 
operations Force components.
it is intended that the VJTF will include 4,000 troops trained to move on 48 hours’ 
notice to hotspots in any naTo member state. nonetheless, this contingent would be 
too small to counter the massive military might russia has deployed along its western 
frontier. The spearhead force is to be part of a wider naTo response force of 13,000–
30,000 troops that could take weeks to deploy in a crisis. it will benefit from equipment 
and logistics facilities pre-positioned in Eastern Central European countries, but the 
troops will not be permanently stationed in the region (naTo 2015). The force could be 
used as a mobile tripwire when dispatched to a threatened state. However, at this stage 
in its deployment, it is difficult to estimate the effectiveness of a relatively small VJTF 
contingent in deterring russia’s outright invasion of a naTo member.
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in February 2015, naTo decided to establish six command centres in Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, poland, romania and Bulgaria to connect national forces with naTo rein-
forcements. They will be used for logistics, reconnaissance and planning missions with 
a multinational headquarters in Szczecin, on poland’s Baltic coast. This will enable the 
rapid influx of thousands of naTo troops in the event of a crisis. The positioning of 
military hardware without the presence of uS and other allied troops is premised on the 
assumption that the local armed forces would be capable of defending the country for a 
sufficient time to allow for the timely arrival of more substantial naTo units.
Chairman of the uS Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey has stated that 
america’s military is ready to ensure the deployment of high alert forces within 48 hours 
to naTo countries bordering russia (Joinfo 2015). if this is insufficient to stem a rus-
sian attack, then washington will be ready to use additional force to protect its allies. 
General philip Breedlove, naTo’s Supreme allied Commander for Europe, has called 
Moscow’s conquest of Crimea a ‘paradigm shift’ that requires a fundamental rethink-
ing of where american forces are located. in February 2016, Secretary of State John 
Kerry announced that the uS will significantly upgrade its commitment to the security of 
Europe’s eastern flank, with a planned four-fold increase in spending on the European 
reassurance initiative, from $790 million to $3.4 billion.
To maintain naTo as an effective deterrent, washington needs to adopt a more for-
ward presence on the ‘eastern front’. naTo must also update its security posture to 
deal with new threats. For example, the washington Treaty should be updated, espe-
cially article 5 and the definition of an attack on a naTo member. This must reflect 
the challenges associated with contemporary warfare, including externally generated 
insurgencies, cyber-attacks, information warfare, and other forms of subversion aimed 
at undermining state independence or truncating its territory.
The alliance needs to prepare for a wide assortment of unconventional threats and 
ensure that its capabilities match its commitments, including stronger national capa-
bilities that increase the costs of a russian attack (Grygiel and Mitchell 2014). Local 
forces must possess the ability to protect their own borders and increase the cost of 
aggression even if they cannot win a conflict unaided. in particular, naTo needs to 
place greater emphasis on ensuring the ability of front-line states to defend themselves 
during the critical, early phases of a limited war.
Each naTo state bordering russia requires three fundamental elements: adequate 
infrastructure and pre-positioned equipment to allow for the speedy deployment of other 
naTo forces, early warning of a russian covert attack and capable forces that can 
respond quickly to an assault on its territorial integrity. Each country also needs uS and 
western European forces positioned in them on a permanent basis to act as a tripwire 
against a potential russian attack. Front-line states also require an offensive compo-
nent that can threaten russia’s aggressive operations by targeting its staging areas, 
airports, radar installations, sea and river ports, and logistical nodes (Grygiel 2015). 
Defensive capabilities alone are unlikely to be sufficient to deter a military assault.
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Conclusion
For the uS an unstable and insecure Europe that is fractured internally and whose bor-
ders are challenged by a belligerent russia would constitute the greatest foreign pol-
icy disaster since the Second world war. To prevent such developments, naTo must 
revive its core mandate of defending the European homeland and focus less on out-
of-area operations. By shifting bases and equipment eastward to confront the newest 
threats, naTo can help ensure that it has sufficient manpower and firepower to dis-
suade a russian offensive against the most exposed alliance members. an effective 
naTo remains the key institution for protecting Europe’s security. it may also become 
the sole multinational organisation that can provide the continent with a measure of pol-
icy coherence and maintain the transatlantic link with washington.
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